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Abstract
Background: During the initial containment phase of influenza A/H1N1 2009, close contacts of cases were traced
to provide antiviral prophylaxis within 48 h after exposure and to alert them on signs of disease for early diagnosis
and treatment. Passengers seated on the same row, two rows in front or behind a patient infectious for influenza,
during a flight of ≥ 4 h were considered close contacts. This study evaluates the timeliness of flight-contact tracing
(CT) as performed following national and international CT requests addressed to the Center of Infectious Disease
Control (CIb/RIVM), and implemented by the Municipal Health Services of Schiphol Airport.
Methods: Elapsed days between date of flight arrival and the date passenger lists became available (contact
details identified - CI) was used as proxy for timeliness of CT. In a retrospective study, dates of flight arrival, onset
of illness, laboratory diagnosis, CT request and identification of contacts details through passenger lists, following
CT requests to the RIVM for flights landed at Schiphol Airport were collected and analyzed.
Results: 24 requests for CT were identified. Three of these were declined as over 4 days had elapsed since flight
arrival. In 17 out of 21 requests, contact details were obtained within 7 days after arrival (81%). The average delay
between arrival and CI was 3,9 days (range 2-7), mainly caused by delay in diagnosis of the index patient after
arrival (2,6 days). In four flights (19%), contacts were not identified or only after > 7 days. CI involving Dutch airlines
was faster than non-Dutch airlines (P < 0,05). Passenger locator cards did not improve timeliness of CI. In only
three flights contact details were identified within 2 days after arrival.
Conclusion: CT for influenza A/H1N1 2009 among flight passengers was not successful for timely provision of
prophylaxis. CT had little additional value for alerting passengers for disease symptoms, as this information already
was provided during and after the flight. Public health authorities should take into account patient delays in
seeking medical advise and laboratory confirmation in relation to maximum time to provide postexposure
prophylaxis when deciding to install contact tracing measures. International standardization of CT guidelines is
recommended.
Background
Aircrafts can function as transport vehicle for patients
infected with influenza, leading to introduction of a new
virus strain to non-endemic areas [1,2]. Although the risk
is small, passenger sm i g h tb ei n f e c t e db yac o n t a g i o u s
patient during the flight [3-6], as well as during public
transport [7]. Transmission during the flight increases
the possibility of further transmission in the area of desti-
nation. For these reasons, during the initial phase of the
influenza A/H1N1 2009 pandemic, many countries
initiated contact tracing among flight passengers of
flights where contagious patients with laboratory con-
firmed influenza A/H1N1 2009 were notified.
A risk assessment guideline for infectious diseases
transmitted on aircrafts has been developed by the Eur-
opean Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
(ECDC) [8], which includes influenza. Literature study
revealed on-board transmission in flights with a duration
of less than 8 h. The majority of infected contacts during
these flights were seated on the same row, or one or two
rows in front of behind the index [9-12]. Contacts up to
8 and 10 rows distance from the index were infected in
one study [10]. As these contacts also had personal
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a c r o s sad i s t a n c eo fs om a n yr o w si sn o tp r o v e n .T h e
guideline concludes that it is difficult to design a single
contact tracing algorithm for influenza. Due to the short
incubation period of influenza, it is almost impossible to
provide contacts with postexposure prophylaxis (PEP)
within the time that it is most effective, which is 48 h
after exposure [13]. Therefore, the main aim of contact
tracing might be to interrupt the chain of transmission
by alerting contacts for early diagnosis and treatment.
Although the World Health Organization (WHO) devel-
oped technical advice for case management of influenza
A/H1N1 2009 in air transport during the pandemic [14],
no international standardized protocol for contact tracing
for this pathogen was available.
In line with the ECDC guideline [8] and the Dutch
guideline for ‘Incidental introduction of a new influenza
strain’ [15], in the Netherlands close contacts of a patient
with laboratory confirmed pandemic influenza were iden-
tified. In case the index had been contagious during a
flight with a duration of ≥ 4 h, passengers and cabin crew
were to be informed on signs and symptoms of the dis-
ease and to seek medical care in case they would occur.
In addition, close contacts, defined as passengers seated
on the same row, two rows in front and two rows behind
the index case, as well as the cabin crew working in this
compartment, were traced by public health authorities to
provide a 10 day prophylactic course of oseltamivir as
soon as possible (preferably within 48 h after exposure).
Schiphol Airport is the only airport in the Netherlands
where trans-Atlantic flights arrive. Its Municipal Health
Services (MHS, GGD Kennemerland) and the Center for
Infectious disease Control (CIb-RIVM) frequently experi-
enced that, despite all efforts, the time period elapsing
from exposure to administration of the first oseltamivir
dose exceeded the required 48 h. Acquiring contact
details from airlines was time consuming, and contact
details on passenger lists were often minimal, so that
contacts were difficult to trace. In this study, we assess
the time delay in contact tracing of flight passengers for
influenza A/H1N1 2009 as performed in the Netherlands
during the initial phase of the pandemic. Our data show
that despite all efforts the effectiveness of this control
measure in daily practice is minimal.
Methods
From April 29th until June 22nd 2009, contact tracing
among flight passengers in the Netherlands was indicated
for laboratory confirmed influenza A/H1N1 2009 cases,
who traveled on a flight for 4 h or longer while being
contagious, defined as 1 day before, until 7 days after dis-
ease onset. These criteria were installed by the CIb,
which also functions as National focal point (NFP).
The procedure for contact tracing is complex, see
Figure 1. Requests for contact tracing to the CIb for
Dutch index patients originate from any Dutch MHS
which identifies a patient who traveled by plane while
being contagious for an infectious disease which
requires contact tracing. Other nation’sh e a l t ha u t h o r i -
ties will make a request to the CIb in case they diag-
nosed a patient which arrived at Schiphol airport for
transit while being infectious. Requests for CT in the
last group are submitted to the National Focal Point
(NFP) or through the Early Warning and Response sys-
tem of the EU (EWRS). The CIb verifies laboratory con-
firmation, and the indication for contact tracing
regarding flight duration. The MHS of the airport where
the specific flight landed coordinates contact tracing for
flight passengers. In case of Schiphol, MHS Kennemer-
land approaches the involved airline company requesting
the passenger list. The airline provides passenger lists
with at least passenger names, seat numbers and book-
ing or contact details. MHS Kennemerland then com-
pletes contact details through booking offices or using
other search methods. Close contacts living in the Neth-
erlands are traced by the respective Dutch MHS’s. For
tracing foreign contacts, the CIb sends a notification
with contact details to the NFP of the country of final
destination, or through the EWRS system for EU
countries.
During the pandemic, CT requests were turned down
if more than 4 days had elapsed after flight arrival, as
contact tracing was not considered to have additional
value. During the study period, passenger locator cards
(PLC) only were used on direct flights from Mexico dur-
ing the initial phase of the pandemic. These flights were
all run by Dutch airlines.
For each contact investigation performed in the period
April 29th until June 22nd 2009, the following data were
collected: flight arrival date, first day of illness of index
patient, date of laboratory diagnosis, date of contact tra-
cing request and the date passenger lists were obtained
and contact details were completed (’contacts details iden-
tified’). From these data, time intervals (in days) between
flight arrival and date of diagnosis (interval I), between
diagnosis and request dates (interval II) and between
request and contact details identified dates (interval III)
were calculated, see Figure 2. Date of actual contact tra-
cing and oseltamivir administration was not available in
this study, but is inherently always hours if not days later.
As the airline company traces contacts amongst crew-
members, these are not included in this study.
Data were analyzed using SPSS software (version 18,
USA). The influence of availability of PLC’s on timeli-
ness and the origin of the airline company (Dutch or
non-Dutch) were statistically analyzed.
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In the period April 29th until June 22nd 2009, 24 indi-
cations for CT were identified. Three international
requests concerning CT for influenza patients diagnosed
outside the Netherlands were declined as already more
than 4 days had elapsed since flight arrival. In 17 out of
the 21 remaining contact investigations, passenger lists
with contact details were obtained within 7 days after
arrival (81%), see Table 1. In total contact details of 451
close contacts were identified, of which 199 contacts
lived in the Netherlands, and 252 contacts abroad. The
average number of close contacts per flight was 27
(range: 8-44). In four contact investigations (19%), con-
tact details were not obtained, or provided later than 7
days after flight arrival and CT was stopped. These CT
were all related to non-Dutch airlines, and total delay
RIVM/
NFP
CT request
(national/  
international)
MHS NL, Dutch 
contacts
Passengerlist
(incomplete 
data)
 
GGD 
K’land
1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8
Ewrs/NFP,
international contacts
Airline
Figure 1 Routing of contact tracing for close passenger flight contacts during the influenza A/H1N1 2009 pandemic.Ar e q u e s tf o r
contact tracing (CT) reaches the NFP of the RIVM (1). After checking the indication, the request is forwarded to the MHS/GGD Kennemerland (2)
who will submit the request at the appropriate airline (3). The airline collects contact details of the passengers and returns this to the GGD (4).
Dutch contacts will be informed through the MHS of their region (5, 8), international contacts list are returned to the NFP/RIVM. The NFP
requests the concerned public health authorities through the NFP or EWRS contact points to trace the contacts (6, 7).
Figure 2 Delay intervals in contact tracing amongst flight passengers. Interval I, II and III are defined as serial intervals between the dates
of flight arrival, date of diagnoses, date of contact tracing request and date of contact details identified respectively.
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Page 3 of 8Table 1 Overview of 17 contact investigations (n.a.: information on these dates was not available)
Nr Flight arrival
date Schiphol
Dutch (DA)/
foreign airline
(FA)
Origin PLCª
used
First date
of illness
Date of
diagnosis
Date
request
CT
Date
contacts
identified
Interval I: flight
arrival - diagnosis
Interval II:
diagnosis -
request CT
Interval III: request CT
- contact identified
Total Delay
(I + II + III)
1 27-4-09 DA Cancun No 27-4 29-4 29-4 30-4 2 0 1 3
2 30-4-09 DA Cancun No 30-4 6-5 7-5 7-5 6 1* 0 7
3 6-5-09 DA Mex city Yes 4-5 7-5 8-5 8-5 1 1 0 2
4 6-5-09 DA Mex city Yes 6-5 11-5 12-5 12-5 5 1** 0 6
5 14-5-09 FA Detroit No 12-5 n.a. 16-5 16-5 *** 0 2
6 21-5-09 DA NewYork No 22-5 n.a. 25-5 26-5 *** 1 5
7 29-5-09 DA Houston No 29-5 n.a. 2-6 2-6 *** 0 4
8 29-5-09 DA Houston No n.a. 3-6 4-6 4-6 5 1** 0 6
9 2-6-09 DA NewYork No 2-6 3-6 4-6 5-6 1 1 1 3
10 8-6-09 DA Toronto No 2-6 n.a. 10-6 11-6 *** 1 3
11 13-6-09 DA NewYork No 13-6 15-6 16-6 16-6 2 1 0 3
12 18-6-09 DA Cancun Yes 13-6 19-6 19-6 20-6 1 0 1 2
13 14-6-09 DA Miami No 13-6 16-6 17-6 18-6 2 1 1 4
14 9-6-09 FA Boston No 7-6 11-6 12-6 13-6 2 1 1 4
15 14-6-09 DA Cancun Yes 11-6 16-6 17-6 17-6 2 1 0 3
16 14-6-09 DA Cancun Yes 14-6 17-6 18-6 19-6 3 1 1 5
17 18-6-09 DA Miami No 18-6 20-6 20-6 23-6 2 1 2 5
Mean
(95%
CI)
2,6
(1,6-3,6)
0,8
(0,6-1,1)
0,6
(0,3-0,9)
3,9
(3,2-4,7)
*:. In the beginning of the pandemic one request for contact tracing was accepted after 7 days
**: these late CT requests were accepted as the passenger lists of the concerned flights already were available from earlier contact investigations
***: date of diagnosis not known
ª: Passenger Locator Card
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8was stated 8 days for further data processing. Of the 21
requests, the total delay between request and contact
detail identification was longer for non-Dutch airlines
(mean 6,3 SD 2,7) compared with Dutch airlines (mean
4.1 days, SD 1,5)(1-sided Mann-Whitney test, p = 0,033).
For the 17 completed contact investigations, interval I
was the largest interval in the contact tracing procedure
(mean 2,6 days, range 1-6, 95% CI 1,6-3,6, n = 13). The
other intervals II and III were shorter, with a mean of
0,8 days and 0,6 days respectively, see Table 1. Figure 3
s h o w st h em e d i a n so ft h ed e s c r i b e di n t e r v a l s .S i n c e1 5 /
17 index cases were already ill before, or during the day
of arrival of the flight, the delay in interval I is mainly
caused by delay in seeking medical advice and diagnostic
procedure itself. After acceptance of the request for CT
by the CIb, GGD Kennemerland needed on average 0,6
days (range 0-2, 95% CI 0,3-0,9 days) to collect the pas-
senger list from the airlines and complete contact details
(interval III). The total delay between flight arrival and
identification of contact details was on average 3,9 days
(range 2-7 days, 95% confidence interval 3,2-4,7 days),
see Table 1. In only 3 out of 17 contact investigations
(18%), contacts were identified within 2 days after arri-
val. In 2 out of these 3 contact investigations, PLC’s
were available. Interval III of the 5 CT with PLC’s avail-
able was shorter (0,4 days, SD 0,5) than for 12 CT’s
without PLC (0,7 days, SD 0,7), this was not significant
however (p: 0,25). Overall delay in CT with PLC’sa l s o
was shorter (mean 3,6, SD 1,8), but not significant,
when compared to CT without PLC’s (mean 4,1, SD
1,4) (p:0,25).
Discussion and Conclusions
In this study we evaluated the timeliness of contact tracing
(CT) of flight contacts in daily practice. We conclude that
t h ep r e v a i l i n gp o l i c yt op r o v i d ec l o s ec o n t a c t sa n t i v i r a l
PEP during the early phase of the influenza pandemic is
very difficult to implement effectively and therefore has lit-
tle effect to control disease spread. Active case finding
through contact tracing of exposed persons is an impor-
tant procedure during the containment phase of an emer-
ging communicable disease. However, our data show that,
even in a small-industrialized country with modern com-
munication tools, tracing of flight contacts exceeds the
required maximum of 48 h after exposure.
For influenza, close contacts of contagious index cases
are entitled to receive antiviral PEP within 48 h after
exposure to prevent them from becoming ill and further
spreading of the disease. Starting oseltamivir within 48 h
does not prevent disease but shortens the disease period,
mitigates symptoms and might decrease further trans-
mission. Awareness among contacts to seek medical eva-
luation when influenza-like (ILI) symptoms occur, for
both proper antiviral treatment and (home-) isolation
advice, reduces further spreading. As influenza has a rela-
tive short latent period, for influenza A(H1N1)/2009
varying between 0,7-3,1 days [16,17], contacts ideally
should be informed within 1 day. Oseltamivir postexpo-
sure prophylaxis for this pandemic strain is reported to
be effective even when administrated more than 48 h
after exposure in household settings [18], however, delays
in administration are not specified. We cannot exclude
the possibility that in our study, even delayed administra-
tion of oseltamivir prophylaxis may have prevented some
people from becoming ill, although we anticipate the
effectiveness of the intervention overall to be less in this
setting than in households.
Our study among 17 contact investigations showed an
average total delay of 3,9 days between flight arrival and
identification of contacts by passenger list, which is too
late for effective PEP, and late for alerting on first symp-
toms of disease. Only in three contact investigations
(18%), contact details were obtained within 48 h. How-
ever, after identification of passenger details, health
authorities need time to actually trace the contact and
administer PEP. It is highly unlikely that this was
achieved within the same 48 h. We therefore conclude
that contact investigation for provision of PEP as con-
ducted here was ineffective.
Regarding the awareness of ILI symptoms, Schiphol
Airport handed all passengers on flights arriving from
Mexico information leaflets on influenza A/H1N1 2009
with information on early symptoms and requesting
them to seek medical advice in case of fever and respira-
tory symptoms such as coughing. Posters with this
Figure 3 Box plot distribution of serial intervals.T h eb o x p l o x
show Intervals I (delay flight arrival and date of diagnosis), interval II
(delay date of diagnosis and CT request) and interval III (date of CT
request and contact details identified), representing median, 25%-
75% Quartile (IQR, in boxes), values between 1,5 IQR (lines) and
outliers (* and ° with flight numbers).
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Page 5 of 8information were placed in passenger halls, to inform
passengers arriving indirectly from Mexico via transit
through other airports, or arriving from non-endemic
areas with higher transmission (e.g. USA). As contact
details were identified on average 3.9 days after expo-
sure, however not contacted yet, we conclude that CT
did not have additional value for timely achievement of
increased awareness.
It is not a new finding that contact tracing of flight
passengers is a time-consuming procedure [8]. In one
study among flight passengers during the pandemic in
2009, 52% (53/95) of the contacts were reached within
72 h [5]. In a measles contact investigation, 75% (202/
275) of responding passengers were contacted within 72
h. In this study however, the diagnosis of measles was
already suspected during the flight, and laboratory con-
firmation was initiated immediately after landing [19]. It
also helped that many contacts were tourists staying at
the same hotels, which facilitated tracing them.
Our study shows that the longest delay before identifi-
cation of contact details for an influenza index case is
caused by the time between arrival and laboratory diag-
nosis (interval I, 2,6 days). This delay is a result of
patients delay in seeking medical care, and doctor’s
delay, including laboratory confirmation. For influenza,
the indicated laboratory test was Polymerase Chain
Reaction, which takes several hours to obtain the result
and in the beginning of the pandemic, the PCR test was
not yet available in many laboratories.
Patients delay was considerable however. It even took
the seven passengers with date of onset before the flight,
and therefore symptomatic during the flight, 1 to 2 days
after arrival before laboratory confirmation was made.
Also, none of the airline reported that these patients
already were identified during the flight, nor that infec-
tion control measures were taken. For the indexes that
became ill on the day of arrival, delay until laboratory
confirmation still lasted 3 days (range 1-6 days). A pre-
pandemic study by Sharangpani et al. among flight pas-
sengers showed that they are more willing to seek physi-
cians care in case they developed flu-like symptoms
when the perceived the pandemic as serious [20]. Leggat
et al. demonstrated during the pandemic that only a
minority (35,5%) of Australian citizens would cancel
their air travel in case of cough and fever lasting more
than 1 day. This was higher among persons who were
more concerned about the pandemic [21]. In the Neth-
erlands, the perceived severity of the disease decreased
significant during this study period [22]. We expect that
the delay until laboratory diagnoses in this study consid-
erably is affected by patients delay seeking medical care,
which might be better in diseases experienced as more
threatening.
Collecting passenger details from foreign airlines also
caused considerable delay because of differences in time
zones and the need to convince the concerned airline
companies about the urgency to collect and hand-over
passenger lists with contact details. Sometimes official
request letters were necessary for legal reasons to
release personal contact details. Dutch companies were
easier to convince by Dutch health authorities to hand
over passenger details. Our data show that contact
details that were identified too late or not at all, indeed
more often originated from non-Dutch than from Dutch
airline companies. An internationally standardized con-
tact tracing protocol, communicated with the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and
International Air Transport Association (IATA), would
facilitate the timeliness, and therefore effectiveness of
contact tracing.
Although one might expect differently, timeliness of
CT for flights where PLC’s were available, was not bet-
ter than CT for flights without PLC. However, PLC’s
reduces the effort, in terms of staff support for airline
companies and the municipal health service to collect
useful passenger information considerably. PLC’sw e r e
only used by Dutch airlines, who already were able to
provide passenger lists relatively quickly. This also
explains the limited attributed shortening in timeliness.
Contact details on PLC’s might be more accurate to
trace the passenger than details provided by the passen-
ger list or booking station. This is further investigated.
This study has several limitations. As available data
were recorded in days, and not in hours, it was not possi-
ble to determine the time intervals more precisely. As
this was both with first and last date of the intervals, we
expect no negative or positive bias. Secondly, the arrival
date was used for date of exposure, while the actual expo-
sure might have already taken place the day before at
departure of the flight. This would imply an increase in
delay and decrease the effectiveness of contact tracing.
Also, we have no data if, and when contacts were actually
reached and oseltamivir was administered. Since several
steps were still required to reach the contacts after they
were identified through passenger lists, this only would
have lead to further delay in administrating prophylaxis.
Further investigation into the timeliness of administra-
tion of prophylaxis among these contacts is initiated, to
have insight in the delay of this last interval to facilitate
future decisions on the effectiveness and necessity of
contact tracing among flight passengers. Lastly, this study
includes CT initiated at only one airport. CT procedures
might be different at airports in other countries, which
influences interval III. As this is not causing the main
delay, we do not expect that in other countries CT would
be much faster.
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passengers during the initial phase of pandemic A/
H1N1 2009 was not effective, as timely provision of PEP
could not be achieved in most cases. Most contacts
came from an endemic area (Mexico) or areas with well
known increased transmission during the first 2 months
of the pandemic. The additional risk for those travelers
of being a close contact during a long haul flight is
small (3,5%) [5]. Furthermore, airline companies and/or
Schiphol airport already provided contacts with informa-
tion on the disease and its symptoms by. The benefit to
inform them of the fact that they were contacts of a
laboratory confirmed case did not justify the extra effort
health authorities invested in contact tracing, especially
during a period where public health officials, airports
and airline companies were absorbed by efforts of other
pandemic related control measures.
In hindsight, the limited burden of disease of influenza
A/H1N1 2009 did not justify contact tracing efforts. The
main reason for flight contact tracing is raising alertness
for possible exposure to uncommon infectious diseases,
enabling early recognition and treatment of the disease
and timely installation of control measures (e.g. SARS
and viral hemorrhagic fevers). For some diseases, PEP is
indicated as well. The risk assessment upon which the
decision to install contact tracing is based should incor-
porate - apart from an evaluation of the severity and
rarity of disease - an assessment of the required timeli-
ness of effective control measures [23]. The expected
time for laboratory confirmation of index cases and
identification and tracing of contacts should be related
to the maximum period during which quarantine, PEP
or other control measures are effective in order to
decide on the benefit of this time consuming procedure.
Lastly, also cabin crew should be aware of their role of
signaling infectious patients. In consultation with medi-
cal professionals, direct control measures can be
installed, as well as medical evaluation after landing.
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